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Introduction 
Uncertainty is a salient feature of most domains 
of expert knowledge and of . the problems to 
which it is applied. Developers of rule-based 
expert systems have employed several different 
techniques to represent uncertainty and make 
inferences under uncertainty. We shall refer to 
these techniques generically as uncertain 
inference systems (UIS's). 
Probability is by far the most extensively 
developed formalism for representing 
uncertainty. but the majority of researchers in 
rule-based expert systems have not found it very 
appealing hitherto. Instead they have developed 
more ad-hoc techniques, notably Certainty 
Factors used in Mycin (Shortliffe, 1976), and the 
related approach used in Prospector (Duda et al, 
1976). Other methods in which there is current 
interest are Fuzzy Set Theory (Zadeh, 1984, 
Kaufmann, 1975), the belief functions of 
Demp::;ter-Shafer theory, Cohen's theory of 
endorsements, and Doyle's theory of reasoned 
assumptions. There is increasing debate about 
the relative merits and flaws of these approaches 
(e.g. see (Cohen et al, 1984, Spiegelhalter, 
1985)), and the question arises of how to decide 
which is most appropriate for a given 
application. 
A major difficulty in comparing them is that they 
make quite different fundamental assumptions 
about the nature of uncertainty. Where the 
notion of subjective probability in Bayesian 
Decision Theory refers to the degree of belief in 
a hypothesis, Fuzzy Set theory addresses 
vagueness or linguistic imprecision, and 
Dempster-Shafer theory addresses the degree of 
evidential support or disconfirmation. They also 
have varying types of theoretical status. 
Probability theory is based on explicit axioms of 
rational choice behavior; whereas other UISs, 
such as Mycin's Certainty Factors, have only 
heuristic justification, seeming to be useful even 
though they have do not have a precise, 
operationally defined meaning. 
The second set of issues in comparing UISs are 
pragmatic. How easy is it to implement? What 
kinds of knowledge structures does it imply? 
How easy is to elicit the expert judgments 
required in this form? How easy is to understand 
the conclusions of uncertain inferences? And 
not least, how much computational effort does it 
require? In keeping with the pragmatism 
dominant in research in AI and expert systems, 
these issues, particularly the last. seem to have 
been the prime determinants so far in choice of 
UIS. 
Researchers in AI have given more attention to 
qualitative issues of syrnbolic reasoning, than 
issues of quantification of uncertainty. Indeed 
there is a common perception that results are 
insensitive to the method of quantification 
employed. although we have been unable to find 
experimental tests of this belief. Thus a third 
type of question in selecting among UIS is about 
their performance: Does it make a significant 
difference in terms of the conclusions of 
uncertain inference which approach you use? If 
not. then we may continue to use the simpler 
methods such as in Mycin, without having to 
worry about the complexities of some of the 
other UISs. But if there are situations in which 
commonly used UISs produce clearly incorrect 
or counter-intuitive results, then at least we 
should be aware of these so we can avoid them. 
If these situations are common then perhaps we 
should change our choice of UIS, or identify a 
need to develop better methods which combine 
greater theoretical soundness with pragmatic 
ease-of-use. Until more thorough tests of the 
performance of current UIS's are carried out, we 
cannot know how much of a problem there is, 
and so it is hard to tell the degree of urgency. 
The main goal of this paper is to present a 
framework for making such experimental 
comparisons, some analysis of the behavior of 
selected UIS's for rule-components and some 
preliminary results with an example rule-set. 
Formalisms for representing 
uncertainty 
In this section we will provide an extremely brief 
introduction to the most popular formalisms for 
representing uncertainty, including probability, 
as used in Bayesian Decision Theory (BOT), 
Mycin certainty factors (Myc), Fuzzy Set Theory 
(FST), and Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). 
Probability 
Probability is certainly the oldest and most 
widely used formalism for representing 
uncertainty, at least outside Artificial Intelligence 
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research. The probability of a proposition, 
according to Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT), is 
a measure of a person's degree of belief in it, 
given the information currently known to that 
person. It is defined operationally in terms of the 
person's willingness to take bets based on the 
truth of the proposition. Thus the notion of 
probability derives from a set of simple axioms 
about decision·making (Savage, 1954). The 
force of these axioms, and hence of the laws of 
probability derived from them, arises from the 
fact that a people who violate them and act on 
"incoherent" probabilities (which, for example, 
do not satisfy Bayes' rule) are liable to 
demonstrable loss. Most famously, an opponent 
could always design a '.'Dutch book", that is a 
combination of bets that they would be willing to 
accept, according to their professed beliefs, but 
which in sum would result in a guaranteed loss. 
It has also been shown that for any reasonable 
scoring rule (which rewards a decision maker 
based on the truth of uncertain propositions), 
any scalar measure of unctirtainty is either 
worse than probability (produces a lower score) 
or is equivalent to it (de Finetti, 1974). 
It is important to note that these proofs are 
prescriptive, not descriptive. They do not claim 
that people actually behave according to the 
tenets of BDT or use subjective probabilities, but 
only that they could not do better than to follow 
it. Indeed there is a considerable psychological 
literature showing that human judgment is liable 
to predictable biases and inconsistencies arising 
from the cognitive heuristics we use (Kahneman, 
Slavic & Tversky, 1982). 
A �et of m propositions, {A1, A2, ... Am}, each of wh1ch may be true or false, gives rise to 2m 
different possible elementary events, each being 
a particular combination of propositions, e.g. 
(11&.-,A & ... Am). A full joint probability d1stnburlon over these propositions specifies a 
probability for each event, and so requires 
specification of 2m· 1 p�rameters. (The extra 
parameter is taken up by the constraint that the 
probabilities sum to 1.) 
A rule such as, A &-,A __.A with probability p, has a natural interprehtio� as a conditional 
probability: p(A ·lA ,...,A)= p Such conditional 
probabilities and3 rrfargi�al probabilities, p(A.), 
representing prior opinions on events, impose'a 
s�t �f li�ear constraints on the joint probability 
d1stnbut1on over the propositions. The 
exponentially large number of degrees of 
freedom to be specified and computational effort 
in updating distributions when new evidence 
becomes available make it quite understandable 
that expert system research has shied away from 
this full probabilistic representation. 
Mycin certainty factors and Fuzzy Set 
theory 
Probably the earliest and most widely·used 
method for inference under uncertainty in expert 
systems are the Certainty Factors originally 
developed for Mycin (Shortliffe, 1976) and 
increasingly used in other systems. These were 
introduced as a computationally simpler 
alternative to subjective probabilities. They 
represent degree of belief in a proposition by a 
number between -1 and 1: 1 represents "certain 
truth", 0 means "no evidence", and -1 means 
'lcertain falsity'.'. 
Fuzzy set theory (FST) (Kaufmann, 1975 Zadeh 
1984) is intended to represent "fu�zy" 0� 
linguistically imprecise terms, such as a "tall 
man", in contrast to the "crisp", well-defined 
events to which probability applies. For 
example, if T is the set of heights of "tall men" 
then U1(x) is a fuzzy membership function, with value O· for x = 48", 1 for x = 84", and some 
smooth, monotonic transition from 0 to 1 for 
heights in between, defining the "degree of 
membership in T" for each x. Much more on 
FST can be found in the literature. 
· 
Both Myc and FST can be used to assign 
. numbers to indicate uncertainty about 
propositions ("Bill is tall"), and to implication 
rules ("If Bill is tall and Bill is strong, then Bill is 
heavy"). They use rules of similar form to obtain 
strengths for conjunctions, disjunctions, and 
modus ponens implication. The strength of a 
pro�osi�ion is attenuated by the strength of the 
1mpllcat1on rule to obtain the strength for the 
conclusion. This process may be repeated all 
the way along a rule proposition tree, to 
propagate uncertain beliefs from its leaves (data 
nodes) to its roots (conclusions). 
Dempste r-Shafer Belief Functions 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is designed to 
handle cases where the probability distribution is 
incompletely known. Shafer (Shafer, 1984) gives 
the following illustration. We've asked Fred if 
the streets are icy. He replies "No", and we 
know that 80% of the time he speaks accurately 
and honestly. and 20% of the time he speaks 
carelessly, saying whatever comes to mind. 
Without a prior on the proposition "the streets 
are icy", or a conditional probability that Fred is 
correct when speaking carelessly, a naive 
Bayesian would be unable to produce a 
p�sterior �robability that the streets are icy, 
g1ven Fred s answer. With t1 ="the streets are 
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not icy",· t = "the streets are icy", Shafer derives 
a belief oro.8 in {t1}, 0 in {t2}' and 0.2 iri {t1,t,}, 
�0
e
�;��i t;�n�a��2 ��� t�J�i;�2�f evidence lor 1, 
Shafer defines a frame of reference as the set of 
basic events and all its possible subsets, in this 
example T = {{t1}.{)J.{t1.t2}}. It is convenient 
to use the notation dvr) = l a,b] for a subset -r of 
T, where a = bel(-r), b = bei(T·-r), i.e. a is 
strength of evidence for -r (its support) and b is 
strength of the evidence against it. In the 
example d({t2}) = [0 .. 2) meaning nothirg for it and .8 against it. A Bayesian would try to 
allocate the remaining .2 between t1 and t2, but Shafer's point is that, if we don t have the 
information (priors etc.) we can and should leave 
it open. Complete lack of evidence is analogous 
to [0.�): a probability of 0.5 is analogous to 
[0.5,0.'5]. Thus DST is a generalization of 
probability, which allows )ack of evidence to be 
represented in addition to probabilistic· belief. 
DST also provides methods such as Dempster's 
rule for combining evidence from. different 
sources (Shafer, 1976). 
Unfortunately, when a frame of reference S has 
m propositions, and n = 2m basic events, there 
are 2n subsets in that frame. Using such a belief 
function could potentially be a burden that is 
exponentially greater than the full probabilistic 
representation. However, there are arguments 
that approximations can be used, and an 
important special case where a simple exact 
function can be used. Unfortunately the special 
case is a strong argument against the 
approximations, as we shall argue below. 
Com paring UISs 
To answer questions about differences in 
performance, a common interpretation of the 
inputs and results is required to make them 
commensurable. Presumably, the ultimate 
purpose of any expert system is to lead to better 
decision. If two different representations of 
uncertainty lead to making the same decision, 
then they are operationally equivalent. 
According to Bayesian Decision theory, 
decisions can reveal probabilistic beliefs about 
the outcomes on which the decisions are based. 
Even it the decision-maker doesn't actually have 
probabilistic beliefs, if he chooses coherently he 
wtll act as though he has them. So in principle, if 
a non-probabilistic approach to uncertainty 
provides an integrated theory of how to make 
decisions based on its· representations of 
uncertainty, then this would imply an operational 
correspondence between uncertain beliefs 
expressed in the probabilistic and non-
probabilistic forms, where they produced the 
same decision. This would allow direct 
comparison of the representations. Notably, 
however, the non-probabilistic approaches do 
not provide agreed upon decision strategies, 
and so this is unfortunately impossible. 
Nevertheless, there are obvious, simple ways to 
make transformations from at least FST and 
Mycin to probability. For FST one can simply 
estimate probability by the fuzzy membership 
function: \ 
p(x) = f(x) 
This corresponds to the interpretation of f = 
LJ8(x) as "the probability that x will be classified as S, by the expert after whom the system is 
modelled, is f". The FST combination rules then 
form a quasi-probabilistic model of the expert's 
reasoning. 
For Mycin, the conversions are taken from the · 
verbal definitions of Certainty Factors, m(x) 
(Shortliffe, 1976): 1 means tru�. so p(x) = 1, 0 
means no evidence, so we assume the prior, p(x) 
= p'(x), and ·1 means definitely, so p(x) = 0. 
We use piecewise interpolation between these 
three points of correspondence. 
DST can be looked at as providing bounds on 
probability. The belief in an event set .,. , 
a= Bel (-r ) and in its complement, b = Bei(T-1') , 
provide lower and upper bounds on its 
probability. We will derive and discuss some 
problems with this below. 
Extra parameters and assumptions about 
correlations 
As we mentioned, the number of parameters of a 
joint probability distribution over m propositions, 
has 2n • 1 free parameters. In general, the 
number of conditional probabilities, specifying 
rule strengths, and marginal probabilities, 
specifying prior beliefs, which elicited from 
experts, will be far few�r than the number of 
parameters, and hence insufficient to completely 
the joint distribution. 
Any uncertain inference method, by implication 
at least, makes certain assumptions about the 
unspecified parameters, particularly the 
correlation between propositions. For example, 
the combination rules for Fuzzy Set Theory and 
for Mycin (under some conditions on the prior) 
are equivalent to probabilistic inference 
assuming maximum correlation between the 
propositions. One can also use simplified 
probabilistic inference methods that assume 
minimum correlation or independence between 
the input propositions. For convenience we will 
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label these assumptions, "MaxC " ,  "MinC", and ' 
"lnd" respectively. The following table gives the 
combination rules for calculating the probability 
of the conjunction and disjunction of two events, 
A and 8, as a function of their probabilities, p(A) 
and p( II), corresponding to each assumption. It 
also gives "probabilistic modus ponens", that is, 
1'1. H), as a function of p( A), and the "rule 
strength" or conditional probability, p(IJIA). In 
the latter case, the assumptions about 
correlation or independence are subject. to 
p(I! IA). and are assumed to constrain J!{ !JI-,A). In 
particular MaxC (and FST) implies that 
pUJI--,.-1)=0, MinC implies p(RI-,A)=l, and we 
assume that lnd lies between them and implies 
J!{HI-,A>=0.5. To avoid these somewhat arbitrary assumptions Prospector (Duda et al, 
1976) .allows explicit specification of this "lower 
strength" for each rule p(BI-,A)=O. 
For maximum correlation (MaxC): 
p(A&B)= Min(p(A),p(B)), 
]i.AorB)= Max(p(A),p(B)), (1) 
JX.B) = p(B!A)xp(A) 
For Minimim correlation (MinC): 
p(A&B)= Max(O,p(A) + p(B)-1), 
}i..AorB)= Min(l.Ji..A)+ p(B)), (2) 
p(B) = p(BIA)]i.A) + 1- p(A) 
For "Independence" (lnd): 
p(A&B) = p(A)p(B), 
JX.AorB)= p(A)+ p(B)- p(A)p(B), (3) 
]i..B)= p(B!A)]i.A)+ [1-]i..A)]/2 
p<A or t=
B:.:...> -":..t:•:...:·--=..P.,:.;< A:.:... >...:'+-£ o_P ,.._;;.P"?�-,..., Bf-> =_8_.+4 t-;:::r:r 
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·· 
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•• 
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8 8.258 &.588 8.7:58 1 
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Figure 1: 
To visualize the possible effect of this range of 
assumptions about the correlations we have 
graphed some implications of these rules in 
Figures 1 to 4. Figure 1 shows p(AorB) as a 
function of p(A) for p(B)=A , and Figure 2 shows 
Ji..A&B) as a function of p(A) for p(B)= .6. In both 
these cases Mycin and Fuzzy Set Theory make 
the identical assumption to MaxC, that is 
8. 7:58 
• ./ .·:=:::::::�:::? 
. .. . 
-:�·�:��---··· __ .
. _.,.../ . . 
8.5M 
8.2:58 
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a = p<A> 
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Figure 2: 
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Figure 3: 
p<B> ys� p<A>. fop p(BIA>:8.3 
� -� 
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1 
8 
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Figure 4: 
Figure 3 shows the probability of conclusion C, 
as a function of rule strength p( Bl A), for the 
probability of the antecedent, p(A)= 0.4, and 
Figure 4 shows it as a function of p(A), for 
p(JJ!A)=0.3. In these cases Fuzzy Set Theory is 
still identical to MaxC, but Mycin is assumes that 
if the antecedent is false then p(B) is unaffected 
102 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
·I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and remains at its prior p(IJI-· A)= p (IJ). Since 
Mycin depends on what prior prob�bilities are 
used we show three examples, "Myel", "Myc3" 
3nd "Myc.5" which assume all priors are 0.1, 0.3 
and 0.5 respectively. Under all conditions, Maxc 
and Mycin give the lowest probability of the 
conclusion. The range of error becomes very 
large for small p(A), for any rule str.ength. 
Whereas the slope of p(B) with respect to the 
rule strength is similar for the three probabilistic 
UIS's, MinC. MaxC and lnd, the slope with 
respect to p(A) is larger for MaxC and Mycin with 
small priors. Indeed Figure 4 shows that the 
slopes can have different sign. FST can respond 
in the opposite direction to the lnd assumptions, 
and so can Mycin if the rule str�ngth is less than 
its prior. Under these circumstances alternative 
assumptions can lead to qualitatively quite 
different behavior. 
The maximum entropy prin ciple 
Any assumptions, such as those discussed 
above, of correlation or absence of correlation 
imply additional information that has not in fact 
been given. So in general they have no basis. 
One approach to this problem is to explicitly 
minimize the additional information implied by 
choosing the prior distribution that maximizes 
entropy subject to the constraints of the 
specified rule-strengths and probabilities. 
Essentially the maximum entropy distribution 
makes the weakest possible assumptions 
consistent with the specified knowledge. 
Similarly, when additional information is 
obtained on a specific case, the prior can be 
updated to incorporate it by minimizing the 
cross-entropy (MXE) between the prior and 
posterior distributions. Cross-entropy is a 
measure of how much information one would 
have to receive to change one distribution into 
another1• 
Shore and Johnson (Shore and Johnson, 
1980) have proved that this MXE approach has 
several very desirable properties. It produces a 
unique result that is invariant under any one-to­
one transformation of the co-ordinate system for 
specifying events, and under changes in 
between equivalent forms for specifying the joint 
distribution of pairs of independent events and 
subsystems. Any other method for filling in the 
1Thus, although Zadeh criticizes UIS's other than FTS for 
"assuming away" missing or ambiguous data, the FST 
algorithms he advocates are operationally equivalent to 
making stronger assumptions than necessary, by virtue of 
the fact that they give different results than the minimum 
cross entropy, or minimum assumption, method. 
distributions, subject to linear constraints (such 
as rule· and data-strengths). and which satisfies 
these weak and highly desirable conditions 
would give the same results, and so ue identical 
in effect. 
Of course, the estimate need not be computed 
via the general MXE calculation. Indeed, there 
are several important special cases: assuming 
independence when no correlation data is 
provided (a rule-strength is information on h.ow 
the antecedant and consequent are correlated), 
ordinary conditioning when probabilities are 
provided for disjoint events (including Bayes' 
Theorem). For rule- and data-strengths, the log­
linear model is formally quite similar, and has 
been used with.good results in several projects. 
In sum'mary, the use of other UIS gives results 
operationally equivalent · to using various 
assumptions within BOT, but by the above two 
arguments, MXE gives the only estimate 
consistent with BOT. Hence, using UIS which are 
not operationally equivalent to MXE will incur 
losses from violations of BOT. Using calculus of 
variations and simple numerical search 
algorithms, we can calculate the appropriate 
maximum entropy distributions for small 
problems quite simply, albeit slowly, and so are 
able to find the MXE conclusions as well as 
those of the other UIS, and so can compare 
them to assess how large or small the incurred 
-losses are. 
Comparing UIS behavior for a simple rule 
Probably the most typical form of rule in rule­
based systems is where a consequent is 
dependent on the conjunction of a set of 
antecedent propositions. To obtain some 
insights into how various UIS's compare with 
each other and with the maximum entropy 
method (MEP}, it is useful to explore a simple 
rule with two antecedents. We express the 
consequent, C as conditioned on the two 
antecedents, A and 8, as p(C/A&B) = p, and 
examine the behavior of p(C) as a function of 
p(A), p(B) and p. 
In this case we will compare MEP, Mycin, FST 
and Ind. The FST assumes maximum correlation 
between A and 8, and A&B and C, in equations 
(1). Likewise lnd assumes independence 
between each pair. The MEP method first 
calculates the prior distribution that maximizes 
entropy of the joint distribution p(A,B,C), subject 
to the given conditional probability, and then 
obtains the posterior distribution given the 
marginals p(A) and p(B), with minimum cross­
entropy to the prior. For a fair comparison Mycin 
uses the same priors as the MEP distribution, but 
updates them using Mycin combination rules. 
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Figures 5 and 6 show p(C) as a function of rule 
strength p:: p(C/A&B), for fixed values of p(A) 
and p(B). Figure 7 shows p(C) as a function of 
p(A) for fixed p and p(B). (A and B enter 
symmetrically and so p(A) and p(B) could be 
interchanged.) In all cases lnd is very similar to 
MEP (and so is largely obscured by it in the 
graphs). The methods are most similar for large 
p{A) and p(B), having similar slope with respect 
to p for p(A)>.5, p(B)>.5 as in Figure 5. In all 
three cases FST gives the lowest probability 
p(C), but the largest slope with respect top and 
to p{A). Note that FST gives a positive slope with 
respect to p(A) for p<0.5, and p(A)<p(B), as in 
figure 7, even when all other methods give p(A) 
negative slope. As illustrated in Figure 6, Mycin, 
unlike the others, can give a negative slope with 
respect to p. implying that the stronger the rule 
the less likely the consequent. This happens for 
all p(A)<pofAJ. Note that if the priors are all very small. as may be true in some applications, then 
the Mycin certainty factors and rule strengths 
will remain positive, and hence this counter­
intuitive behavior will be avoided. But in general 
both FST and Mycin can behave in qualitatively 
different fashion to the other methods. 
A problem with Dempster­
Shaler Theory 
The definition of Dempster-Shafer Belief 
functions suggests an obvious correspondence 
with probability, with the Belief functions 
providing upper and lower limits on the 
probability. But Shafer resists this interpretation, · 
and in fact it turns out that the results of making 
this correspondence are trivial. This arises from 
an unexpected consequence of the definition of 
the belief function. To explain this we must first 
give a m_ore formal definition. 
In general, Shafer utilizes four objects to derive a ·  
belief function: Two frames of reference, S and 
T, each of which contains a set of basic events 
and all its possible subsets, a probability 
distribu!i�� over t�e basic events in �· p8, and a compattbthty relatton C such that set tff s can be 
true in S simultaneous with t being true in T. For 
sE aCS and t E TC T, Shafer defines a belief in -r 
via (4) 
-
Bel(-r)=ps{sf(\1 tXsCt-+ IE -r)} (4) 
Let us now consider an interesting special case 
of DST, by returning to Shafer's "icy" example. 
Let s1 = " Fred was careful and honest", 
�2 =:'. " Fre�. was carele�s·:,. t1 ="streets are not rcy , t2..= streets are ICY ; we know p(s1 ) = 0.8, p(s2) = u.2, and s1 and t are incompatible. The compatability relation between S and T is shown 
in figure 8, along with p8 . We know that Psr must have the form given, but without more data 
a naive Bayesian could not calculate a precise 
value for tx. Let us consider, however, that there 
is a remote possibility of (s1 &t2) happening -
Fred misheard the question, we misheard the 
answer, it has since cooled, or something else. 
This gives figure 9 
The new Bel function gives DST( {t1}) = [0,0], 
DST( {t2}) = (0,0], DST( {t1 ,t�J) = [1,0], no matter how small {3 is. This discontinuous h sensitivity 
to Ps suggests that ignoring " negligable 
events T. will generally have radical effects. 
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. .. 
t:, .8 .�0< 
t. 0 .l.(l-><) 
Figure 8: Shafer's example 
. .. 
t", .fJ- /3 .�0( 
t. /] .l.(l-><) -
Figure 9: Shafer's example modified 
The pathology arises in the following general 
case. Equation (4) implies equation (5). 
Bel(T)= (5) 
Ps{ �(V' t)(ps1{tls)>O--+ t E r)} Bel(r)=max Pfa), s.t/1/ sEa )(p 5j,.ls) = 1) 
Suppose �hat. Psr does not .definitively rule out any combrnatron of s. and t., 1.e. PsT·SxT--+ (0,1). 
Then the only r wh\ch is1 guaranteed, for any 
a L S, is T itself. Hence, DST(r) = [0,0) for all 
'T C T, and DST(T) = [1 ,0]. In BOT, p (a) is 
clearly a tight lower bound on Pr(T), whiSh can, 
but usually will not, be acheivei:l. In everyday 
terms, this extreme conservativism requires us to 
completely ignore whatever anyone says, unless 
we literally believe them to be infallible. In the 
military application of processing sensor data, all 
data would be ignored, because individually 
each sensor is fallible, and there is even a 
remote chance that all will fail simultaneously. 
But ignoring reports of incoming missiles is very 
likely to be fatal. 
Clearly, this is ridiculous, and any expert who 
treated improbable events equally . with the 
probable ones would perform quite poorly. As a 
Bayesian, one can show that the expected cost 
of ignoring possible events declines smoothly 
toward zero as their probability de�lines toward 
zero. Indeed, knowing p(t2js1)<1o
· 0 in figure 9 
would surely be enough to justify ignoring the 
possibility of (t2 &s.,), and there is no need to seek a precise numoer. But to avoid using such' 
estimates about correlations between the S and 
T frames was Shafer's aim, and so the 
Bayesians' way of handling Bel's discontinuous 
dependence on esr is inadmissable. Of course, 
if we do use 1:1ayesian reasoning to jusfjy 
ignoring improbable events and weak 
correlations, then the problem becomes one of 
bounding· or sensitivity-analysis within BOT, not 
one of OST versus BOT. 
Evaluating 
results 
differences in 
Given some method for tranforrning the 
conclusions of non-probabilistic UIS's to be: 
commensurable with probabilities, we need 
some way to evaluate the importance of the 
differences between results. If we had an 
explicit utility function for dec isions based on the 
output of the inference system, then we could 
simply calculate the expected loss in utility for 
using suboptimal inference methods. But in 
practice explicit utility functions are often hard 
to come by. So we propose to use both mean 
absolute enor and mean squared error, on the 
grounds of simplicity and also because of their 
consistency with plausible classes of· utility 
function. 
Normalizing error estimates 
A difficulty arises in comparing performance on 
different cases in that they are likely allow 
different ranges of error. For example, if we 
randomly guess at the probability of 0.5, it is 
impossible to be off by more than 0.5, but if we 
guess the probability of an almost certain event 
(probability 0 or 1 ) , then it is possible to be off by 
almost 1. An error near .5 is almost the worst 
possible in the former case, but is about average 
for the second. So it is useful define normalized 
performance measures, which compare 
estimates to random guesses, and the worst 
possible results. The worst possible estimate of 
p is max(p, 1·p). We can define the random 
guess value as the expected error, if the 
estimate were uniformly distributed over the 
estimator's domain. For example, for FST, the 
domain is the closed interval [0,1]; for MYC, the 
closed interval [·1, + 1 ) ; for DST, the triangular 
region {(a.b)IO�a:$b$l}, where a is the lower 
bound on p and b is the upper bound. The 
expected mean ab�olute error, .u(lej), and mean 
squared error, p.(e ) , for such random guesses 
are given below for different UIS's: 
FST: 
l 
p.(lel);;:: i� p(l = p) 
l 
2 -p.( e ) ""'3 = p(l �m p) 
MVC: 
p.(jel)= 
105 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
DST: 
(2(ti + p02)+ Q-4pp0)/(4Q), 
w/l('rcQ ={Po ifp<.po 
2 I- p otherwise !!(£ )= {) 
(2p 2-6pp0+6tl+ I+ p -3p)/6 0 . 0 
!!<It I>= 
_l} 7 -;;;(/ + ( 1- p)3)+ ip( 1- p) 
l 11 
_:;(A+ IJ)-9, 
where{ A = p3/n(p) 
, B=(l-p)3/n(l-p} 
l!(t')= 11/36- p(l- p) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
The normalized measures rescale the errors to 
give 1 for zero error, 0 when as good as random 
guessing, and· ·1 for the worst possible, with 
linear interpolation in between. The normalized 
absolute error, is given by piecewise linear 
interpolation between: 
1J = + 1 iff e = 0. {12) 
1J = 0 iff e = !!(lei) 
1J = ·1 iff e = max(p,1-p) 
The normalized squared fror, f is defined 
similar!y wit� mid-point p.(e ), and worst value 
max(p ,(1-p) ). 
Comparing performance on an 
exampl e  rul e-set 
All considerations given above come together in 
the framework diagrammed in figure 10. The 
experiment begins with a collection of rules, R, 
stated as conditional probabilities of 
consequents given antecedants, and prior 
probabilities. In this example, the rules allow 
inferences about the probabilities of four 
different kinds of nuclear reactor accidents. 
Aside from the conditional probabilities of 
accidents given symptoms, it seems plausible to 
include a rule that the probability of no accident 
is quite small, since the system would not be 
used unless alarms had sounded - but false 
alarms are possible. These rules are taken to be 
a general description of the domain. as opposed 
to the case-specific data, D, which describes 
which particular alarms and symptoms a 
particular accident caused. The MEP prior, p0, is estimated by maximizing entropy subject to the 
rules R. This prior is then updated using 
minimum cross-entropy, by D to yield the 
posterior p 1, from which the probabilities of 
various accident types (i.e. the conclusions) may 
be read. R and D are also converted to whatever 
strengths the current UIS uses, giving R' and D', 
which might be a collection of Mycin rule­
strengths and CF's. The UIS is then used to 
propagate the D' using the rules. R', to obtain 
the strengths for the conclusions, C', which are 
then converted back to probabilities, p' 1, and 
compa,red to p1. 
Figure 10: Basic Experiment Design 
it is important. to note .that p1 !s estimated in two stages, by usmg R wtth max1mum entropy and 
using D and p0 with minimum cross entropy, rather than using RUD with maximum entropy. 
To see why, consider a case where one rule is 
"given swollen belly and sickness in morning, 
there is .a 40% chance ot pregnancy", and 
. another is "given male-ness, there is a 0% 
chance of pregnancy". The data is that the 
patient has a swollen belly. is sick in the 
morning, and is a male. Whatever our prior p0 is, 
if it is consistent with the two rules, then when it 
is updated with the data, it will give a probability 
of zero to pregnancy. Hence, in the posterior p 1, 
the probabilitY. of pregnancy given male-ness IS 
zero, not 40%2. It would be impossible to have 
the rules and the data both hold in one 
distribution, and if possible would lead to the 
wrong conclusion of a 40% chance that a male 
was pregnant. 
The original rule incorporated the assumption 
that there was a significant chance of the patient 
being female, which is directly contradicted by 
the new data. If rules were conditioned on not 
just one or two propositions, but on every 
possible proposition, then they would include no 
assumptions about prior probabilities, and it 
would make no difference whether p1 was found 
in one step or two, or even conditioned several 
times by different D's along the way. But 
2 A simple example of the non-monotonic reasoning 
inherent in BOT. 
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eliciting rules in this form may be a good deal 
harder. 
The following nuclear reactor accident diagnosis 
example is presented less as a definitive analysis 
than an illustration of the genera l methods and a 
source of suggestions for future research. The 
rules are taken from (Kunz, 1984); there are 9 
rules and 18 propos i t ions , including 10 leaves 
(data D), 4 roots (conclusions C), and 4 
intermed ia te propostions, I. The four 
conclusions are designated A, B. C. and D., as in 
figure 11. 
c 8 
J__ IA,. J L J 
P tv L K 
J�J 
Q f\ E F 1' A 
T H G 
Figure 11 : Example rule·· set 
We specified rule-strengths, varying from 70% to 
95%. and added two new rules · that the 
probability of no accident was 1 %; and the 
probability of a single accident was 95%. Hence, 
there was a 4% of a multiple failure. It should be 
noted that these two rules induce certain other 
correlations , which might be expressed as a 
cyclic set of conditional probabilities, such as 
p(B!A)<0.04. 
This set of 11 rules was used to form prior p as 
in figure 10, which was then used with diftePent 
D 's in four different tests. For each of the four 
accident types to be concluded, we picked out 
those leaves which directly or indirectly 
supported the conclusion and set their 
probabilities to 95%; all other leaves were set to 
5%. For each case, the MXP posterior p1 was computed for comparison with the results of the 
other UIS's. FST, Mycin, lnd, and DST. Averages 
of the absolute error It!. squared error, e2 and 
the corresponding normalized errors, 1J and r 
were calculated tor the intermediate I and 
conclusion C propositions, and both types 
together. These averages for FST, MYC, lnd and 
DST for one of the tests are shown in figure 1 2; 
results for the other three tests were qualitatively 
similar. FST tended to guess probabilities as too 
extreme, i.e. it treated data as supporting or 
disconfirming conclusions too strongly. MYC did 
the same, but not as much . One would expect 
MYC to do better than FST I even though it has 
similar combination rules, because it uses data 
from the prior which FST do�s not. Also, it �nly 
reasons about changes from the prior to the 
posterior, rather than directly about the 
poster ior . DST always did s lightly worse than 
chance, because its error function is influenced 
both by the width and the off-centeredness of  
the estimate, and it always had the greatest 
possible width. DST showed the pathology 
discussed earlier, and its poor results should b e  
viewed i n  that light. 
r----·- r-··--- - -- --=- ·-·· F5T MYC DST IND PRS 
..---· 
lEI I 357 .2·37 .'2SS .077 . 10'-f 
c ."2 2 4- .20C . "JC{ t..f . 3lflf .136 1---· 
I -:-3t8 oqJ. -.1 '+- 4f .702 . 5'1) 'L c .]3} . 2} q -.o:YJ. -_12 I . S I  q 
E_1 _!: .14-1 .065.088 .Of_ I .otS 
. c .052 .0'-fLf ,127 ./22. .023 _...;_ --·-'-+--· 
( J_.�q? ... . p?2_;l15 . 88lf .83 I 
__ c. . 5 79 . S 5 1.f ::o72 _to6 .786 
Figure 12: Summarized comparison results 
MYC is ranked better than FST for mean 
absolute error, but vice versa for the normalized 
errors. This might be interpreted as FST making 
better use of what information it has, but MYC 
slightly more than compensates by using. more 
data. Interestingly , by all four measures the 
performance on C was better than on I, for FST 
and MYC even though one would expect errors 
to compound and performance to deteriorate as 
we propagate strengths farther. 
Final remarks 
Detailed analysis of the behavior of a single rule 
in isolation, as outlined in the first part of the 
paper, can give some insights into the 
differences In behavior between UIS's and the 
conditions under which they differ, qual itatively 
and quantitatively. However the ultimate impact 
of these differences within a system of many 
rules depends on aggregate characteristics of 
the system. To understand these we must 
explore wider clases of rule sets, both 
experimentally and analytically to understand 
the results . 
The experimental observations presented, being 
based on only four different tests using one rule­
set, are primarily illustrative. There are obviously 
many interesting lines of research open at this 
point . using a wider variety of rule-sets, other 
UIS's, using other methods of correspondence 
between probabilities and non-probabilistic 
UIS's, including perhaps a fairer test of DST, and 
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so on . The main purpose of th is paper is to 
present and and try to justify a framework for 
t8sti ng  the accuracy of UIS's results, ignoring for 
the moment issues of computational effort, 
clarity. or simpl ic ity. 
The debate among the partisans of different 
UIS's seems to be increasing in intensity, and at 
t imes verges on the acrimonious. The 
divergence both in philosophical underpinnings 
and in programmatic goals of researchers fllay 
have contr ibuted a degree of mutual 
incomprehensio n  between the various 
parad igms.  Whi le th.e difficulties i n  resolving 
such confl icts · should not be underestimated 
(Kuhn,  1 962) , we · bel ieve that clearer 
presentation . of these fundamentals and 
exami!lati on of the methods against the full 
range of criteria, including the theoretical, 
pragmatic issues, as well as the experimental 
comparison of performance explored here, 
cou.Jd shed some needed l ight.  Different people 
will  have d i fferent  weightings for these criteria, 
reflecting their d i fferent goals, and so it may 
never be appropriate to attempt definitive 
evaluation of the techn iques. But in any case, 
better analytic and exper imental evidence which 
compares the performance of UIS's in terms of 
the ir results, could help to provide system 
designers a more solid basis for choosing 
among them. 
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